Determination of Significant Market Power in the Retail Markets for Access to Call Services including Domestic Calls from a Fixed Location

Final Determination

20 April 2016

Ref: MCD/04/16/021

Public Version

(Confidential information has been replaced by [X])
DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER


1. For the reasons set out in the Annex to this Determination, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of the Kingdom of Bahrain (the 'Authority') has identified the markets to be the retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.

2. Furthermore, the Authority has identified and determined that no licensee has a position of Significant Market Power in the retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.

3. This Determination is without prejudice to the Authority's powers under the Telecommunications Law, promulgated by the Legislative Decree No.48 of 2002, the Competition Guidelines, issued by the Authority on 18 February 2010 (ref. MCD/02/10/019), and the outcome of any on-going or future investigation, consultation or other regulatory process or measure carried out pursuant to such powers, all or any of which may result in the application of different terms and/or findings than those of this Determination, including the Determination and definition of new markets and the designation of Significant Market Power.

4. The Authority will continue to monitor developments in this market and may conduct a review of the market at some future time, with a view to determining if any Licensee holds a position of Significant Market Power, should the Authority determine that changes in market conditions warrant it. Such a review may conclude with a Determination that supersedes this present Determination.

5. This Determination supersedes the Determination of Significant Market Power in certain relevant retail markets issued by the Authority on 3 June 2008 only to the extent that that Determination relates to the retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.

6. This Determination shall come into effect from the date of its issuance.

Signed on 20/4/2016

[Signature]

Mohamed Bubashait
General Director
Telecommunication Regulatory Authority
Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain
DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER


1. For the reasons set out in the Annex to this Determination, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of the Kingdom of Bahrain (the "Authority") has identified the relevant market to be the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.

2. Furthermore, the Authority has identified and determined that Batelco has a position of Significant Market Power in the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls made from a fixed location.

3. This Determination is without prejudice to the Authority’s powers under the Telecommunications Law, promulgated by the Legislative Decree No.48 of 2002, the Competition Guidelines, issued by the Authority on 18 February 2010 (ref. MCD/02/10/019), and the outcome of any on-going or future investigation, consultation or other regulatory process or measure carried out pursuant to such powers, all or any of which may result in the application of different terms and/or findings than those of this Determination, including the Determination and definition of new markets and the designation of Significant Market Power.

4. This Determination supersedes the Determination of Significant Market Power in certain relevant retail markets issued by the Authority on 3 June 2008 only to the extent that that Determination relates to the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.

5. The Authority will review this market as part of a periodic review of the list of relevant markets or sooner, should the Authority determine that changes in market conditions warrant it. Such a review may conclude with a Determination that supersedes this present Determination.

6. This Determination shall come into effect from the date of its issuance.

Signed on 20/4/2016

[Signature]

Mohamed Bubashait
General Director
Telecommunication Regulatory Authority
Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain
## Annex 1 - Reasoning for the Determinations

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<td>Average Revenue Per Minute</td>
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<td>ARPU</td>
<td>Average Revenue Per User</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batelco</td>
<td>Bahrain Telecommunications Company B.S.C</td>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>Carrier Pre-Selection</td>
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<td>BD</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>IDD</td>
<td>International Direct Dialling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ofcom</td>
<td>Office of Communications (UK communications regulator)</td>
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<td>OLO</td>
<td>Other Licensed Operator</td>
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<tr>
<td>POTS</td>
<td>Plain Old Telephone System</td>
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<td>PPCC</td>
<td>Pre-paid Calling Cards</td>
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<td>PSTN</td>
<td>Public Switched Telephone Network</td>
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<td>RTN</td>
<td>Retail Tariff Notification</td>
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<td>SMP</td>
<td>Significant Market Power</td>
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<td>SMR</td>
<td>Strategic Market Review</td>
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<td>SSNIP</td>
<td>Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price</td>
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<td>TRA</td>
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1 Introduction and purpose of this Annex

1. The Strategic and Retail Market Review of 2008 ("2008 Review") considered the role of regulation in the telecommunications sector in Bahrain and established a package of regulatory measures designed to promote competition and the interests of Bahraini consumers.

2. Competition has developed significantly in Bahrain in the years following the 2008 Review, leading to lower prices and greater service innovation for Bahraini consumers. The Authority therefore carried out a holistic review of ex ante regulation as part of the 2015 Strategic Market Review¹ ("SMR").

3. The SMR concluded, amongst other things, that certain markets warrant further analysis to determine whether ex ante regulations that are currently imposed on these markets should be lifted. These markets include:
   a. Retail market for premium access to call services, including domestic calls from a fixed location;
   b. Retail market for mass-market access to call services, including domestic calls from a fixed location; and
   c. Retail market for international outgoing calls from Bahrain.

4. The present competition and market review addresses the analysis for the markets identified under items (i) and (ii) in the above list which are referred to hereafter as "premium access to domestic calls" or "premium access market" and "mass-market access to domestic calls" or "mass-market", respectively.

5. A separate review, with separate documentation, is being carried out for the retail market for international outgoing calls from Bahrain.

6. These Determinations and Annexes summarise the conclusions and verify the SMR's underlying reasoning for the market definitions in the mass-market and premium access markets. A competitive assessment follows to determine whether or not any operator enjoys a position of Significant Market Power ("SMP") in these markets.

7. An SMP determination in respect of the relevant markets provides the legal basis whereby regulatory obligations deemed necessary and/or mandated by the provisions of the Telecommunications Law promulgated by the Legislative Decree No. 48 of 2002 (the 'Telecommunications Law') can be defined and implemented.

8. This Annex, i.e. Annex 1, is structured as follows:
   a. Section 2 provides an overview of the analytical framework used to identify SMP in a relevant market.
   b. Section 3 summarises the 2008 determination on the retail markets for narrowband access and domestic calls (i.e. the previous definition for the mass-

market access and premium access markets), and provides a summary of existing regulation.

c. Section 4 summarises the developments in this market since 2008.

d. Section 5 outlines the 2015 SMR’s findings and the conclusion on the definition of the relevant markets for domestic calls in Bahrain.

e. Section 6 carries out the competitive assessment in the defined markets.

f. Section 7 presents conclusions and implications.


10. Annex 3 provides a list of tables and figures presented in Annexes 1 and 2.
2 Analytical framework

11. To determine whether a licensed operator (or operators) hold SMP and/or a Dominant Position in a relevant market, the Authority has adopted a three-step process:
   a. Define the relevant market(s);
   b. Analyse the state of competition in the relevant market(s); and
   c. Identify whether an operator(s) has SMP / Dominant Position.

12. At each step, the Authority relies on well-established economic principles and tests to define markets and assess competition. For example, in defining relevant markets, the focus is to ensure that the market boundary includes those services that are considered by users to be close economic substitutes for one another (demand-side substitution) and between which suppliers could easily switch production (supply-side substitution). To assess demand- and supply-side substitution, the hypothetical monopoly test\(^2\) can be a useful tool. The Authority's market definitions focus on the markets in which domestic call services are supplied.

13. The identification of relevant markets is not an end in itself, but is a critical step in assessing the extent to which any firm or firms in those markets have market power. Defining markets and assessing competition within those markets involves a degree of judgment, with the overarching purpose being to ensure that all relevant competitive constraints operating in a market (from both existing and potential competitors) are identified.

14. Throughout the three-step process, the Authority applies an analytical framework that is consistent with the Telecommunications Law and the Authority's Competition Guidelines.\(^3\) The tools and principles employed by the Authority are similar to those employed by other regulators and competition authorities, including the European Commission and national telecommunications regulatory authorities of the European Union.

15. Having identified the relevant markets, the Authority then looks at relevant factors to determine the level of competition in those defined markets, such as barriers to entry and expansion, and market shares. The purpose of this competition assessment is to identify any constraints, such as those from existing competition, potential competition, and any countervailing buyer power, that may limit the ability of an incumbent supplier of retail access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location to act independently of its competitors or customers and exercise market power.

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\(^2\) As set out in the Authority's Competition Guidelines, the "hypothetical monopoly test" identifies a group of products which are sufficiently close substitutes to be regarded as being in the same market. The approach is to assume that the products are supplied by a hypothetical monopolist. If the monopolist is able to profitably maintain a "small but significant non-transitory increase in price" ("SSNIP") for those products, then the appropriate market boundary has been defined (i.e. to include only those products), as no other products are regarded as being close demand-side or supply-side substitutes.

\(^3\) See "Competition Guidelines: Guidelines issued by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority", 18 February 2010 (Ref: MCD/02/10/019).
16. The Telecommunications Law refers to two concepts of market power, namely a Dominant
Position and SMP. The Competitions Guidelines interpret the distinction to be in terms of
the markets in which the concepts apply.\(^4\) Dominant Position\(^5\) applies to an assessment
of market power at the wholesale level while SMP applies to market power assessments at
the retail level.

17. Findings of dominance and SMP impart different ex ante regulatory obligations on the
affected operators:
   a. Article 57 of the Telecommunications Law states that an operator with a dominant
      position in a market shall make available access and interconnection services by
      way of a Reference Offer, with tariffs, terms and conditions that are fair,
      reasonable, non-discriminatory and based on forward-looking incremental costs;
      and
   b. Article 58 of the Telecommunications Law states that operators with SMP shall be
      subject to tariff controls as specified by the Authority by way of Regulation or
      Licence conditions.

18. Article 1 of the Telecommunications Law defines both SMP and a Dominant Position. An
Operator with Significant Market Power is defined as holding a share of 25% or more of
the relevant market as determined by the Authority.\(^6\) However, in determining whether an
operator has SMP, the Authority must also take into account a number of other factors,
including the ability of the Licensed Operator to influence market conditions, its turnover
relative to the size of the market, its control over access to end users, its financial
resources, and its experience of providing products and services in the market. The
Authority may determine that a Licensed Operator has SMP even if its market share is
less than 25%, or that it does not hold SMP even though its market share exceeds 25%.
The SMP assessment is thus carried out for all operators based on their market shares.

19. In practice, the Authority considers that the concepts of SMP and dominance are similar
and seek to capture similar types of behaviour,\(^7\) namely the ability of a firm to act
independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of consumers, for example
by sustaining prices above the competitive level.\(^8\) However, the legal definition of SMP in
the Telecommunications Law places special emphasis on market shares while recognising
the need to consider carefully the ability of an operator to influence market conditions, i.e.
to act independently.

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\(^4\) See Paragraph 90, "Competition Guidelines: Guidelines issued by the Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority", 18 February 2010 (Ref: MCD/02/10/019).

\(^5\) We use the terms Dominant Position and Dominance interchangeably throughout this document.

\(^6\) See Page 8, Telecommunications Law of the Kingdom of Bahrain. Available at

\(^7\) See Paragraph 92, "Competition Guidelines: Guidelines issued by the Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority", 18 February 2010 (Ref: MCD/02/10/019).

\(^8\) For example, the regulatory framework governing the EU telecommunications sector considers the concept of
SMP to be equivalent to that of dominance.
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20. The Authority notes that the aim of undertaking an *ex ante* assessment of market power is to understand how competitive the market currently is and whether this is likely to change within a reasonable timeframe. As noted in the Competition Guidelines, the Authority typically takes the following factors into account when undertaking such a forward-looking competition assessment:

a. the market shares of individual entities;
b. competitive constraints arising from existing competitors, potential competitors, barriers to entry and expansion, and the degree of countervailing buyer power; and
c. evidence on behaviour and pricing.

21. In its competition analysis, the Authority would follow the so-called Modified Greenfield approach.\(^9\) The first step of this approach is for the Authority to assume that there is no retail regulation in place. The next step is for the Authority to consider the impact of any existing wholesale regulation on the competitive outcomes at the retail level. In its analysis, the Authority specifically identifies which existing regulations impact its findings (and how).

22. In reaching its conclusion, the Authority has considered relevant facts and information, including information that the Authority has gathered through its periodic market data questionnaires, requests for additional information under Article 53 of the Law, residential and business surveys as well as other sources of information.

23. In the following sections, the Authority defines the relevant retail market relating to the provision of domestic calls (Section 5.2) and then evaluates whether any Licensed Operator has SMP in the relevant retail markets (Section 6).

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\(^9\) See Paragraph 93, "Competition Guidelines: Guidelines issued by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority", 18 February 2010 (Ref: MCD/02/10/019).

3 Findings in the Strategic and Retail Market Review 2008 and Summary of existing regulation

24. This section summarises the findings on market definitions and competitive assessments in the Strategic and Retail Market Review of 2008 ("the 2008 Review").\(^{11}\)

25. It also provides a summary of the current regulations imposed on the SMP operator.

26. Details on the reasoning behind the Authority's market definitions and competitive assessments in the 2008 Review have been included in Annex 2.

3.1 Conclusions of the 2008 Review

27. The Authority has previously considered the retail markets for access services and domestic calls as part of the 2008 Review.

28. In the 2008 Review, the relevant market was divided into four specific markets with a distinction made between residential and non-residential customers and narrowband access and fixed calls (referred to as "access" and "calls" respectively hereafter).

29. The focal product was the traditional fixed voice service provided over the fixed access copper network i.e. Plain Old Telephone System ("POTS"),\(^{12}\) Mobile was not found to be a substitute for this in either the access or calls market. After presenting its findings for public consultation on 27 August 2007, the Authority took on board responses received from operators and presented its final analysis and conclusions on 3 June 2008.\(^{13}\)

30. The Authority came to the conclusion that the relevant markets should be defined as:

   a. The retail market for fixed narrowband access services for residential customers. (Market 1a);

   b. The retail market for fixed narrowband access services for non-residential customers. (Market 1b);

   c. The retail market for fixed originated domestic calls for residential customers to either fixed or mobile subscribers. (Market 2a); and

   d. The retail market for fixed originated domestic calls for non-residential customers to either fixed or mobile subscribers. (Market 2b).

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\(^{11}\) Available at [http://216.25.41.102/environment/Strategic_and_Retail_Market_Review_Consultation_Final.pdf](http://216.25.41.102/environment/Strategic_and_Retail_Market_Review_Consultation_Final.pdf)

\(^{12}\) This has been referred to as Public Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN") in the 2008 review. Technically, PSTN includes all networks i.e. POTS, ISDN, Managed VoIP, mobile networks etc. However, in the 2008 Review, PSTN was understood to be the traditional fixed voice service provided over the fixed access copper network i.e. POTS. This applies to the current market review as well i.e. the fixed voice service over the copper fixed access network is referred to as "PSTN" hereafter.

31. Based on an analysis of market shares, barriers to entry, market developments, etc. as per the competition guidelines, Batelco was found to have Significant Market Power in all four of the relevant markets (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b).

3.2 Summary of existing regulation

32. Article 58 of the Telecommunications Law states that a licensed operator with SMP shall be subject to tariff controls specified by the Authority through regulations.

33. Following the 2008 SMP Determination and the issuance of the Retail Tariff Notification ("RTN") Regulation in 2010, the services that Batelco supplies in the retail markets for fixed narrowband access services (markets 1a and 1b) as well as in the retail markets for originated domestic calls (markets 2a and 2b) are subject to RTN Regulation. As a result, any changes to Batelco’s tariffs for these services must be notified to the Authority before their introduction, with Batelco required to confirm that such tariff changes adhere to a set of tariff controls.

34. The tariff controls set out in the RTN Regulation are designed to ensure that the proposed tariffs do not give rise to anticompetitive practices, including but not limited to undue discrimination, excessive pricing, margin squeezes, predatory pricing, or abusive tying or bundling.

35. Furthermore, an operator with SMP is required to offer the Carrier Pre-Selection (CPS) Service over its network as per the Telecommunications Law and the 2004 Carrier Pre-Selection Regulation. 

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14 Available at http://www.tra.bh/media/document/FINAL_CPS_REG_MOU_RN1_13th_June04.pdf
4 Developments since 2008

36. Since the 2008 Review, a number of developments in the sector are likely to have affected the competitive environment for domestic calls. These include the increased uptake of mobile services and Over The Top ("OTT") calling services.\textsuperscript{17}

37. Mobile services have grown rapidly in the past seven years and now have much higher subscription penetration levels, traffic numbers and revenues than fixed line products.

38. Alongside this, there has been a decline in the number of active fixed PSTN\textsuperscript{18} lines, whilst ISDN continues to be used heavily by a small number of larger businesses.

39. IP-based solutions are beginning to emerge as an alternative, with traffic and subscribers increasing over time. However, the absolute numbers of subscribers, traffic and revenues still remain low compared to traditional technologies.

4.1 Developments in subscription numbers

40. Mobile technologies account for the vast majority of subscriptions used for domestic calls in Bahrain (90% as of the end of 2014). Mobile subscriptions have grown by 40% since 2010. This can be seen in Figure 1 below.

\textsuperscript{17} OTT services refer to unmanaged VoIP services such as Skype, Tango, WhatsApp, etc.

\textsuperscript{18} As mentioned earlier, Public Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN") technically includes all networks i.e. POTS, ISDN, Managed VoIP, mobile networks etc. However, 2008 Review referred to PSTN as shorthand for the traditional fixed voice service provided over the fixed access copper network i.e. POTS. This applies to the current market review as well i.e. the fixed voice service over the copper fixed access network is referred to as "PSTN".
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Figure 1: Subscription growth by technology

Source: The Authority’s analysis based on operator data

41. PSTN subscriptions have declined by 16% since 2010. ISDN lines, mainly used by larger businesses, have been less susceptible to the competition from mobile and have seen subscriber numbers increase by 10% in the past four years.

42. WiMax/LTE\(^1\) and IP based solutions have also seen strong growth in the past five years, although admittedly from a very low base. WiMax/LTE technologies have grown by 97% and IP-based solutions by 53% between 2010 and 2014.

43. However, WiMax/LTE subscriber numbers have declined slightly in the last two years while those for IP-based solutions have increased by 55% between 2010 and 2014.

44. Mobile accounts for 90% of subscribers (when including all those subscribed to PSTN, ISDN, IP-based solutions, WiMax/LTE and mobile) at the end of 2014. When excluding mobile, PSTN makes up the largest share, with 64% of non-mobile subscribers in 2014. Figure 2 below shows the split of non-mobile subscribers in 2014.

\(^1\) Note that LTE here refers to the technology used under the National Fixed Wireless Telecommunications License (NFWS) rather than the LTE services provided under the IMT-L Licence.
4.2 Developments in domestic traffic minutes

45. As with subscription numbers, the vast majority of traffic minutes in Bahrain are originated on mobile networks, as seen in Figure 3, accounting for 94% of traffic as of the end of 2014.
Figure 3: Domestic traffic carried over different technologies

Note that the time series for PSTN is not available prior to 2012 and that for ISDN is not available prior to 2011.

Source: The Authority’s analysis of operator data

46. PSTN accounts for 2% of traffic minutes and ISDN also accounts for approximately 3%. When examining the traffic carried over technologies other than mobile, PSTN accounts for 49% while ISDN makes up 43%.
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Figure 4: Domestic traffic carried over different technologies in 2014, excluding mobile.

Source: The Authority’s analysis of operator data

47. As such, ISDN traffic minutes are highly disproportional relative to the number of subscribers: Batelco’s 2,600 ISDN subscribers account for as many traffic minutes as its 76,000 business PSTN subscribers.

48. WiMAX/LTE and IP solutions account for a small proportion of traffic minutes in Bahrain. However, the trends for the two differ; traffic carried over IP-based solutions has been gradually increasing while that over WiMAX/LTE has been declining, as can be seen in Figure 5.
49. In summary, the trends in traffic mirror those in subscriber numbers; mobile has seen exponential growth since the previous review and now makes up over 90% of subscribers and traffic.

4.3 Developments in ARPU

50. There appears to have been a convergence in the ARPUs of non-ISDN technologies over time, as seen in Figure 6. This could indicate that these technologies have been competing with each other and constrain each other’s pricing.
51. Figure 7 shows that the ISDN ARPU has remained much higher than the ARPU of PSTN or mobile, indicating that the product is likely targeted at a different customer segment i.e. a small number of high-volume business users. This is in line with earlier observations that ISDN users generate a disproportionate quantity of traffic; 2,600 subscribers made as many minutes of calls as approximately 76,000 business PSTN users.
52. Thus, the levels and trends in ARPU confirm that ISDN could be in a separate market to the remaining technologies and that these remaining technologies could be competitive constraints on each other. This is looked at in greater detail in Section 5.2 when carrying out the market definition exercise.

4.4 Price comparisons with regional average

53. In this section, the Authority compares the prices of PSTN and mobile products with regional averages to assess whether the product pricing is relatively competitive. Prices higher than regional averages may be a cause for concern and should therefore be investigated to determine if the price levels in Bahrain are due to a lack of effective competition in the market, or are a result of unavoidable cost differences.

54. Retail tariffs for mobile and PSTN products in Bahrain largely remain below regional averages based on the 2015 Telecommunications Retail Price Benchmarking Report for Arab Countries.  

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20 At the time the consultation was issued, the 2015 Telecommunications Retail Price Benchmarking Report for Arab Countries was not yet available. Now that the report is available, the Authority has updated the figures in this section with the most recent data available. The full report is available at [http://www.tra.org.bh/](http://www.tra.org.bh/)
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55. As seen in Figure 8 and Figure 9 below, based on a call package of 300 mobile calls per month (split between voice, fixed, message and international), mobile calls in Bahrain remain 45% below the Arab average and 28% below the GCC average. A similar trend was observed for other mobile packages considered in the report.
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Figure 8: Evolution of mobile prices over time

Tariffs of a mobile basket with 300 calls/month

Source: Arab 2015 Telecommunications Retail Price Benchmarking Report for Arab Countries. December 2015. Note that the Report did not have data for 2014 in its data table. The Authority has interpolated the tariffs for this year to present a time series.

Figure 9: Price of a mobile 300 calls/month basket

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<td>65.57</td>
<td>58.08</td>
<td>61.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>61.53</td>
<td>55.36</td>
<td>57.24</td>
<td>32.74</td>
<td>22.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>91.83</td>
<td>70.17</td>
<td>70.17</td>
<td>33.58</td>
<td>45.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>57.38</td>
<td>58.58</td>
<td>43.27</td>
<td>43.26</td>
<td>44.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Average</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>85.65</td>
<td>75.22</td>
<td>56.84</td>
<td>52.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC Average</td>
<td>66.50</td>
<td>58.52</td>
<td>56.33</td>
<td>41.51</td>
<td>39.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The Arab 2015 Benchmarking Report also found that PSTN calls in Bahrain were cheaper than regional averages for both residential and business customers, as seen in Figure 10 and Figure 11 below.

**Figure 10: Tariffs of a PSTN residential basket with 140 calls/month**

![Graph showing tariffs over time]

Source: Arab 2015 Telecommunications Retail Price Benchmarking Report for Arab Countries, December 2015. Note that the Report did not have data for 2014 in its data table. The Authority has interpolated the tariffs for this year to present a time series.

**Figure 11: Tariffs of a PSTN business basket with 260 calls/month**

![Graph showing tariffs over time]

Source: Arab 2013 Telecommunications Retail Price Benchmarking Report for Arab Countries, April 2014. Note that the Report did not have data for 2014 in its data table. The Authority has interpolated the tariffs for this year to present a time series.

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5 2015 Strategic Market Review (SMR) and identification of the relevant retail market

5.1 Conclusions in the SMR

56. The SMR analysed the developments in the sector since 2008. Those which are most relevant to this review have been highlighted in Section 4. Based on the analysis in the SMR, the Authority no longer considered the market definition as per the 2008 determination appropriate.

57. In the SMR the Authority:
   a. Redefined the relevant retail markets as:
      i. The retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from fixed locations;
      ii. The retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from fixed locations.
   b. The redefined mass-market included standard PSTN and fixed-wireless subscription services and provided to residential and business customers. The reasoning for redefining the mass market to comprise both residential and business customers was that the services offered to the two sets of customer are essentially the same, functionally and technologically. Furthermore, the SMR found that this market is increasingly likely to include mobile services, and at the very least a hypothetical monopolist would be constrained by the supply of mobile access and call services.
   c. ISDN services were found to be supplied in a distinct retail market (the premium-access market), which was also found to include IP-based access solutions which could provide "equivalent functionalities and features to ISDN". However, mobile-services were not seen to be a constraint on this market owing to the fundamental technological differences between the two.

5.2 Identification of the relevant retail market

58. As explained in the introduction in Section 1, the market definition exercise was carried out in the SMR.

59. Since the SMR, 2014 data has become available, and the Authority has now analysed this to ensure that the market definition as per the SMR remains appropriate.

60. Based on this assessment, this section therefore defines the relevant retail markets for access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.
5.2.1 Combining access and calls markets

61. The 2008 Review had defined separate markets for narrowband access and calls. At the time, mobile and WiMax were recent entrants into the market. PSTN was the prominent technology and access and calls were not always sold together. Furthermore, the degree of competition in the two markets was found to be different with several OLOs competing with Batelco in the market for call services.

62. As seen in Section 4, mobile has seen significantly increased take-up since 2008. The use of pre-paid calling cards (PPCCs) for making domestic calls, on the other hand, has declined, as seen in Figure 12.

**Figure 12: Domestic traffic carried over Batelco's network through PPCCs**

[Graph showing traffic over time]

Source: The Authority's analysis of operator data

63. This has diminished the need for a distinction between access and calls. The rise in mobile subscriptions and traffic and simultaneous decline in PPCCs imply that access and calls are increasingly being purchased together.

64. Thus, the MNOs competing with Batelco in the calls market also compete with Batelco as access-providers.

65. Given the similar competitive environment in both markets, it is now appropriate to analyse them as a single market.

5.2.2 Relevant customer market
66. This section assesses the extent to which the residential and business PSTN products are substitutes.

67. As was outlined in the SMR, there appears to be supply-side substitutability between Batelco’s business and residential PSTN products. The features of the two products are similar, as seen in Table 1 below, indicating that they are effectively the same service from a technological and functional perspective.

Table 1: Comparing Batelco’s residential and business PSTN offering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Residential PSTN</th>
<th>Business PSTN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Installation charge (BD)</td>
<td>BD 20</td>
<td>BD 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly rental (BD/month)</td>
<td>BD 1.160</td>
<td>BD 2.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge for fixed line to fixed line</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge for fixed line to mobile</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Batelco website accessed on 11 August 2015

68. The similarity in the product offering and the pricing (other than the monthly rental) also suggests that the two products could be demand-side substitutes.

69. In theory, there are no barriers to switching between the business and residential PSTN products. A customer would be required to present their CR number if they purchase a business PSTN product. However, the same customer could present their CPR number and acquire a residential PSTN product instead.

70. However, there has been little evidence of switching between the two types of product. As Figure 13 shows, subscriber numbers for business PSTN have remained fairly stable, falling by 10% compared to the 20% fall in residential PSTN subscribers.
71. This is partly driven by the fact that the prices of the two products have not changed over the period and so, the price difference between them has remained at the BD 1 difference in monthly rental.

72. As such, the Authority does not believe that this lack of switching is evidence that the services should be in separate markets.
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Figure 14: Comparing business and residential retail tariffs

OECD basket time series for Bahrain

N.B. Batelco launched Unlimited Bolt-ons in 201321 for the residential PSTN customers which resulted in the drop in price of the high usage residential basket above.
Source: Arab benchmarking report, 201522

73. Given the supply-side substitutability and the likely demand-side substitutability, the Authority finds that separate markets should not be defined for business and residential customers.

74. Furthermore, as is discussed in the sections that follow, it appears that the same technologies are substitutes for PSTN in both customer segments. Given that this would lead to the same market definition and eventually competitive assessment, the Authority has preliminarily defined a single market for business and residential products.

75. However, the Authority is cautious in defining the market as such and will continue to monitor the developments in the business PSTN product to ensure that there is no competition problem in the future.

76. Thus, the relevant market preliminarily includes both business and residential customers.

5.2.3 Relevant product market

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77. This section assesses the substitutability between PSTN and alternate technologies.

78. Batelco offers an ISDN service which allows simultaneous conveyance of voice, video and data traffic. The ISDN service therefore offers more functionalities than the PSTN service with additional features such as supporting LAN connectivity, fast FTP utilisation, remote access to internal networks and back-up capabilities for leased lines. This is also reflected in the fact that typically, larger businesses buy ISDN services while smaller businesses buy the PSTN service.

79. Batelco offers two types of ISDN services, the Basic Rate Access option which provides two channels and the Primary Rate Access option which provides up to 30 channels.

80. As Table 2 below shows, the ISDN services are priced at a significant premium to PSTN services in terms of both installation charge and monthly rental.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Residential PSTN</th>
<th>Business PSTN</th>
<th>Basic Rate Access ISDN</th>
<th>Primary Rate Access ISDN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Installation charge (BD)</td>
<td>BD 20</td>
<td>BD 20</td>
<td>BD 25</td>
<td>BD 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly rental (BD/month)</td>
<td>BD 1.160</td>
<td>BD 2.160</td>
<td>BD 8.500</td>
<td>35BD(10 channels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63 BD (20 channels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84 BD (30 channels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge for fixed line to fixed line</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge for fixed line to mobile</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Batelco website accessed on 11 August 2015

81. Given the differences in the product characteristics and prices, it is unlikely that ISDN and PSTN are demand-side substitutes.

82. Indeed, the pattern of usage of PSTN and ISDN users suggests that they are not likely to be viewed as substitutes. Figure 15 shows that the traffic generated per ISDN subscription is significantly higher than that generated per PSTN subscription.

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83. Thus, even though ISDN is a legacy technology and market reviews and market definitions are based on forward-looking analysis, the Authority has decided to define a separate relevant market for ISDN, as per the SMR, because it is still widely used in Bahrain.

84. Therefore, two separate markets are defined as follows:
   i. The retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, where PSTN is the focal product;
   ii. The retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, where ISDN is the focal product.

85. The extent to which these products have substitutes is now considered.

5.2.3.1 Mass-market access to call services

86. There is strong evidence to suggest that there is demand-side substitutability between mobile and residential PSTN and to a lesser extent, business PSTN.

87. The trend in subscriber numbers suggests that there has been switching from fixed-line to mobile services. Figure 16 shows PSTN subscribers declining while mobile subscribers have increased over the same period. The decline has been sharper for residential PSTN users than business PSTN users implying that there could be a greater degree of substitutability between residential PSTN and mobile, than business PSTN and mobile.
88. There has been a similar decline in traffic over PSTN and an increase in mobile originated traffic, which could point to a certain degree of substitutability between the two technologies. This is illustrated in Figure 17 and could indicate some level of substitution between residential PSTN and mobile, and to a lesser extent, between business PSTN and mobile.
Figure 17: Evolution of traffic

Source: The Authority’s analysis of operator data

89. The steeper decline in traffic than subscriber numbers for PSTN is reflected in Figure 18, comparing the usage per subscription for business PSTN, residential PSTN and mobile. The fall in usage could be reflective of consumers switching to use mobiles to make at least some of their calls.
90. The Authority has also carried out residential and business customer surveys in the period from May to July 2015 to assess satisfaction, perceptions on quality as well as propensity to switch.\(^2\)

91. According to the residential survey, 55% of respondents said that they would switch to making domestic calls through mobile if the price of domestic calls from a fixed line increased by 10%.

92. A similar question was asked in the business survey. However, the results were different. Amongst PSTN subscribers only 16% of business respondents said that they would switch to a mobile service. However, this may be understated by the fact that 55% of the respondents said they provided mobiles to their staff and 33% of respondents said they had mobiles because it was cheaper than a fixed line.

93. In conclusion, given the trends in traffic and subscriptions and the comparability of prices, the Authority finds that mobile is most likely to be viewed as a substitute for residential PSTN.

94. The evidence on switching is less strong between business PSTN and mobile, although it would appear that the two could be substitutes as well, given that the business and residential PSTN products have similar prices and features.

95. Thus, mobile and residential PSTN are likely to be demand-side substitutes based on the evidence discussed above and so, mobile could exert a competitive constraint on

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\(^2\) The results of the surveys will be published in the Authority's website by December 2015.
residential PSTN. Residential PSTN and business PSTN are substitutes as per the discussion in Section 5.2.2. Residential PSTN could thus exert a competitive constraint on business PSTN. The chain of substitution would therefore imply that mobile indirectly exerts a competitive constraint on business PSTN.

96. Thus, there is some evidence of direct substitution between mobile and business PSTN in the form of the survey results. While not compelling when considered in isolation, the Authority concludes that this when put alongside the evidence on indirect constraints means it is reasonable to define the market more widely. That is, the Authority therefore considers it appropriate to define the relevant market to include all three products, namely residential PSTN, business PSTN and mobile.

97. However, the Authority does acknowledge the differences in the strength of the constraint imposed by mobile on business and residential PSTN. For this reason, the Authority will continue to monitor developments in the business PSTN product and intervene should there appear to be a competition concern.

98. Finally, the Authority considers the extent to which IP-based solutions which could be provided over a number of technologies (WiMAX/LTE, ADSL, etc.) could be a substitute for the PSTN product.

99. Operators typically offer a wide range of some IP-based solutions aimed at a variety of customer-types, ranging from residential users to small businesses to large enterprises. The enterprise IP products have features (such as multiple lines) which neither the business nor residential PSTN product offers. Thus, the residential and more basic business products have functionalities equivalent to those of PSTN and so, the extent to which they would be viewed as substitutes for PSTN is considered.

100. IP-based solutions can be accessed using a device connected to broadband (laptop, phone or desktop) or an existing telephone line and provide voice services. As Table 3 shows, the prices on the two products are largely comparable.
Table 3: Comparing PSTN and IP-based solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Residential PSTN</th>
<th>Business PSTN</th>
<th>Etisalcom EtsI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Installation charge (BD)</strong></td>
<td>BD 20</td>
<td>BD 20</td>
<td>BD 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monthly rental (BD/month)</strong></td>
<td>BD 1.160</td>
<td>BD 2.160</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Charge for calls to fixed line</strong></td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>7 fils per 60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Charge for calls to mobile</strong></td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>14 fils per 60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On-net calls</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12,000 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off-net calls</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Batelco and Etisalcom’s websites, accessed on 11 August 2015.

101. Subscriber numbers also seem to suggest that some IP-based solutions may increasingly be perceived as demand-side substitutes for business and residential PSTN products. The subscriber numbers are comparatively low for IP-based solutions at the moment but have been increasing, as seen in Figure 19. The Authority expects these to increase further over time as broadband speeds improve.
102. Based on demand-side substitutability, the Authority therefore considers IP-solutions of equivalent functionality to be part of the relevant market.

103. Thus, in summary, the mass-market would include PSTN, mobile and IP-based solutions\textsuperscript{24} of equivalent functionality which would be an IP-based solution which offers:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] One voice channel; and/or
\item[b.] Standard customer support (which excludes additional services such as but not limited dedicated customer support, dedicated account manager, etc.).
\end{itemize}

\textbf{5.2.3.2 Premium access to call services}

104. The focal product for the premium access market would be ISDN. As mentioned earlier, although ISDN is a legacy technology, the Authority finds it appropriate to consider it as a separate relevant market because of its importance to the business community in Bahrain.

105. Given the functionality ISDN offers and the infrastructure used to provide it, mobile is unlikely to be a substitute from either a demand or supply-side perspective.

\textsuperscript{24} These will include domestic call products provided over WiMAX/LTE.
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106. On the demand-side, mobile is unlikely to be a substitute for ISDN because of the differences in pricing and features. As can be seen in Table 4, ISDN is priced at a significant premium to mobile. This is reflective of the differences in the product characteristics. As outlined in paragraph 78, ISDN has features such as supporting LAN connectivity, fast FTP utilisation, remote access to internal networks and back-up capabilities for leased lines which mobile cannot offer.

Table 4: Comparing ISDN and mobile offerings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Batelco Basic Rate Access ISDN</th>
<th>Batelco Primary Rate Access ISDN</th>
<th>VIVA post-paid Business Unlimited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Installation charge (BD)</td>
<td>BD 25</td>
<td>BD 200</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly rental (BD/month)</td>
<td>BD 8.500</td>
<td>35 BD (10 channels)</td>
<td>BD 10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63 BD (20 channels)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84 BD (30 channels)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge for calls to fixed line</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge for calls to mobile</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-net calls</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-net calls</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Batelco and VIVA’s websites, accessed on 11 August 2015.

107. On the supply-side, the two services are provided over different networks. Thus, it is highly unlikely that a supplier of mobile services could easily and profitably switch to the provision of ISDN services in response to a SSNIP for the ISDN product.

108. The Authority now considers the substitutability between IP-based solutions and ISDN.

109. The Authority has found that IP-based solutions of equivalent functionality (for instance, offering 2 or more channels per subscription) could be adequate substitutes for ISDN on a forward-looking basis. These solutions could be provided over WIMAX/LTE (wireless), ADSL2+ or SHDSL (copper), GPON or Ethernet P2P (fibre), etc.

110. IP-based solutions are still at a nascent stage in Bahrain. However, the functionality offered by the subset of these products aimed at larger businesses is comparable to ISDN. This is because, at a basic level, they offer technical solutions similar to those offered by the legacy telephone network but carried as digital packets over a packet-switched network instead of a circuit-switched network.
111. IP-based solutions, like ISDN, also tend to offer more than just voice. For example, Etisalcom’s solution offers features such as back-up options for critical applications, fax lines and multiple trunks.

112. IP-products aimed at larger enterprises are considerably cheaper than comparable ISDN products at the moment, as seen in Table 5. The prices for the basic ISDN offering and comparable IP product are similar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Bateco Basic Rate Access ISDN</th>
<th>Etisalcom Small Business VoIP solution</th>
<th>Bateco Primary Rate Access ISDN, 30 channels</th>
<th>Etisalcom Enterprise Business VoIP solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Installation charge (BD)</td>
<td>BD 25</td>
<td>BD 35</td>
<td>BD 200</td>
<td>BD 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly rental (BD/month)</td>
<td>BD 8.500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>BD 84.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of lines/trunk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Single line</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fax lines</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge for calls to fixed line</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>7 fils per 60 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 180 seconds</td>
<td>7 fils per 60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge for calls to mobile</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>14-18 fils per 60 seconds</td>
<td>21 fils per 90 seconds</td>
<td>14-18 fils per 60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-net calls</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-net calls</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bateco and Etisalcom websites accessed on 11 August 2015

113. On examining subscriber and traffic data in Figure 20 and Figure 21, it appears that the take-up and use of IP-based solutions has increased in the last 3 years, although the absolute numbers are very low compared to ISDN.

114. The Authority expects that this may change moving forward. As the quality of infrastructure improves, the Authority expects the legacy ISDN technology to be phased out and businesses to switch to IP-based solutions.

115. Indeed, Ofcom, the UK telecommunications services regulator, also found in its 2010 review of the ISDN30 market that it expected businesses to replace their systems and switch to IP-based solutions, although the rate of this switch was not clear.\(^{25}\)

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Figure 20: Evolution of ISDN and IP-based solution subscribers in the Premium Access market

![Graph showing the evolution of ISDN and IP-based solution subscribers from Q1 2011 to Q4 2014. The ISDN line is blue and the IP-based solution line is red.]

Source: The Authority’s analysis of operator data

Figure 21: Evolution of traffic over ISDN and IP-based solutions in the Premium Access market

![Graph showing the evolution of traffic for ISDN and IP-based solutions from Q1 2011 to Q4 2014. The IP-based solution line is blue and the ISDN line is red.]

Source: The Authority’s analysis of operator data
116. On balance, on a forward-looking basis, the Authority is of the view that IP-based solutions of equivalent functionality form part of the relevant market for the provision of premium access to call services.

117. IP-based solutions of equivalent functionality would be ones which offer:

a. Two or more voice channels; and/or

b. Advanced customer support (such as dedicated customer support, dedicated account manager, etc.).

5.2.4 Relevant geographic market

118. In considering the relevant geographic dimension of the market, a focus on demand-side substitution is likely to result in very narrow geographic markets, as the demand for domestic calls is location-specific. A customer requiring PSTN service at a fixed location (e.g. at home) is unlikely to regard PSTN services offered in a different geographic location (e.g. other city) as an economic substitute.

119. The geographic market for telecommunications services is therefore typically defined based on whether there are likely to be variations in the intensity of competitive conditions across different regions. The geographic area across which uniform prices are set is also a relevant consideration.

120. The products defined to be part of the relevant markets are offered on a national basis. For example, in the mass-market, Batelco’s PSTN services are offered over its national network. Competing technologies, such as mobile, are also offered throughout the Kingdom. This is also true for the premium access market. ISDN is offered over Batelco’s national network and IP-solutions are typically offered through wholesale access to Batelco’s network, national WIMAX/LTE networks or through national mobile networks.

121. It is therefore unlikely that the degree of competition varies by region. The Authority’s preliminary view is thus that the relevant geographic market for both mass-market and premium access to calls is national.

5.2.5 Preliminary conclusion on market definition

122. Given the above evidence, the Authority continues to believe that the relevant market is as suggested in the SMR.

123. That is, the market covers the relevant retail markets for access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, and is therefore defined as:

a. The retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls, which includes PSTN, mobile and IP-based solutions26 of equivalent functionality, where equivalent functionality is defined to be the offer of:

i. One voice channel; and/or

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26 These will include domestic call products provided over WIMAX/LTE.
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ii. Standard customer support.

b. The retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, which includes ISDN and IP-based solutions\(^\text{27}\) of equivalent functionality, where equivalent functionality is defined to be the offer of:

i. Two or more voice channels; and/or

ii. Advanced customer support (such as dedicated customer support, dedicated account manager, etc.).

124. Both markets are defined to be national in scope.

125. The Authority presents the operators’ responses to this definition next, followed by its own analysis and conclusions on market definition.

\(^{27}\) These will include domestic call products provided over WiMAX/LTE.
Summary of and response to comments made on the Authority’s proposed definition of the markets for mass-market access and premium access to domestic calls from a fixed location in Bahrain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1. Do you agree with the Authority’s definition of the markets for mass-market access and premium access to domestic calls from a fixed location in Bahrain? If not, please explain why.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary of stakeholders’ submissions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batelco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While Batelco agrees that the retail market for mass-market access to call services should no longer be subject to ex-ante regulation, it does not agree that a separate market should be defined for premium access to call services, or that this market should be subject to ex-ante regulation. Batelco finds that, contrary to the findings in the draft Determination, subscriber numbers for ISDN have actually fallen between 2012 and 2015. Batelco considers that this trend suggests that OTT and mobile services are acting as substitutes for both businesses and consumers. Batelco also argues that there has been a significant move by business consumers to IP-based solutions and that it is inappropriate for the Authority to only carry out a comparison of ISDN with PSTN. Batelco further finds that the SMP finding for the premium access market would lead to regulation at the wholesale level because the current regulatory requirements may require ISDN inputs to be provided as part of the replicability requirements. Batelco also argues that based on the AREGNET Arab benchmarking report, there appears to be no market failure at the retail level for voice services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
because the prices in Bahrain for high and low PSTN usage are at par with or below the benchmark countries. Thus, Batelco states that ex ante regulation should be removed because there is no competition concern in this market. It concludes this would be in line with the precedent set by the European Commission where wholesale and retail fixed line telephony markets were removed from the list of relevant markets. Batelco concludes that given these factors and the size of the proposed market, the proposed market definition and SMP finding is disproportionate.

**Kalaam**

Kalaam agrees with the proposed market definitions for the mass-market and premium access markets.

**VIVA**

VIVA disagrees on two counts with the Authority’s definition for mass-market and premium access to domestic calls markets.

Firstly, VIVA does not believe that both residential and business customers should be included in the mass-market. VIVA believes that although a business customer could in theory switch to a residential PSTN product, this would not be a viable option for them because residential PSTN products do not have add-on services such as ".bh" domain names, email hosting services, etc., which are valued by business customers. According to VIVA, the customer segments also have different needs. For example, businesses need to make more calls in the daytime while residential demand for calls is higher in the evening. VIVA believes that these reasons result in there being limited switching between business and residential PSTN products.

Secondly, VIVA does not find that mobile should be included in the same market as PSTN services and does not agree with the Authority’s chain of substitution. VIVA believes that residential consumers make a decision on whether to purchase fixed voice services as an increment to mobile services, and that the two are not substitutes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Authority does not consider that Batelco’s evidence on PSTN pricing, is relevant for the analysis of the premium access market. Even if Batelco considers that the outcomes at the retail level do not suggest market failure, it is not possible to determine if this will be the outcome absent regulation (since the domestic calls market is regulated at the moment). The Authority believes that the market outcomes for ISDN may be dependent on the presence of regulation. On the other hand, the mass-market for fixed services is constrained by mobile and so, regulation may not be necessary to maintain the current market outcomes.</th>
<th>The Authority notes that Kalaam agrees with its proposed approach.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The Authority acknowledges VIVA’s disagreement with its approach and understands it to be on the following aspects:  
- the definition of a single customer market; and  
- the inclusion of mobile as a substitute for residential and business PSTN. | On the first point, the Authority has defined a single market for business and residential customers in the draft Determination and continues to do so in the final Determination. VIVA has accepted that a business customer could in theory switch to a residential product in the event of a SSNIP in the business product. However VIVA also submits that certain business customers availing from Value Added Services (VAS) such as ".bh" domain name, email and hosting services may not readily switch to a residential product. With regards to VIVA’s argument on VAS, the Authority would like to highlight the following:  
- VAS are generally offered by Batelco as part of retail business broadband packages which are currently subject to ex ante regulation (c.f. Retail Tariff Notification Regulation).  
- While an email service allowing up to 5 email addresses is provided as part of Batelco’s retail business broadband packages, it is also available to subscriber |
For business consumers, VIVA believes that there is "fixed-mobile convergence" rather than substitutability. VIVA argues that business customers consider it is important to receive calls to their business phones on their mobiles. Furthermore, VIVA points to the Authority’s survey evidence which seems to suggest limited propensity for businesses to switch to mobile services in the event of a 10% increase in the price of fixed line services. VIVA also points to Ofcom’s review of the fixed narrowband services market which found that there were factors such as the "air of professionalism" that come with fixed-line services for businesses that may limit switching to mobile.

For these reasons, VIVA finds that mobile is not a substitute for either business or residential PSTN and that business and residential PSTN are not substitutes for each other (for reasons discussed above). Instead, VIVA suggests defining the markets as follows:

- Retail mass-market access to domestic calls from a fixed location in Bahrain for residential customers, and
- Retail premium-market access to domestic calls from a fixed location in Bahrain for non-residential customers (including PSTN product for business segment)

Zain

Zain largely agrees with the Authority’s proposed market definitions.

However, Zain points out that there may be non-tariff reasons which may restrict switching away from Batelco’s business PSTN product such as the inclusion in those products of value-added services such as website/email hosting, data-centre access, etc. Zain suggests that this might explain the limited number of fixed numbers ported out of Batelco’s business PSTN service even after number portability was introduced in 2011. Zain expresses a concern that these barriers mean that the market is not competitive now and will not tend toward competition. Consequently, Zain requests that the Authority should consider the non-price terms which may restrict substitutability between services.

of Batelco’s residential broadband packages (albeit with a limitation to one e-mail address only).

- With regard to domain names, the Authority acknowledges that only companies with a valid CR number can currently obtain a "bh" domain name" and this only through Batelco. The Authority is also aware that Batelco requires the domain name applicant to subscribe to a Batelco business line service (for billing purposes). Pursuant to the Cabinet Affairs Ministerial Resolution no. 3 of 2008, the Authority is however planning to revamp the domain name registration process so that, in the future, there would be several registrars of "bh" domain names other than Batelco and the domain name registration should no longer be limited to businesses but extended to individuals as well. Furthermore, there are approximately 1,600 "bh" domain names that have currently been registered to businesses. Such businesses are likely to be those larger businesses that use premium access to call services rather than traditional business PSTN services. This number of "bh" domain names also needs to be put in contrast with the 75,000 business PSTN subscribers.

- As for domain names, it is larger businesses that would be most likely subscriber to hosting services. Such larger businesses tend to have a premium access to call services or may also purchase hosting services bundled with other corporate data services (e.g. leased line and dedicated internet services).

For the above reasons, the Authority does not consider that VAS would be a decisive factor in limiting the propensity of business customers to switch from business PSTN to residential PSTN in case of a price increase. Thus, both residential and business PSTN can be considered as economic substitutes, which then justifies defining a single customer market rather than separate markets for business and residential users.

On VIVA’s second point, it claims that customers purchase fixed services as an increment to mobile services, but provides no evidence to support this. The Authority has presented evidence of substitution between the two technologies in the draft Determination and does not repeat its analysis here. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Authority stands by its conclusion that mobile and residential PSTN are substitutes.
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The Authority has recognized in the draft Determination that there is some evidence of direct substitutability between business PSTN and mobile but it is not as strong as that between residential PSTN and mobile. However, as also explained previously, the Authority also finds that residential PSTN most likely constrains the pricing of the business PSTN product given the similarity in the pricing and the ability to switch from the business PSTN product to the residential PSTN product. Thus, the Authority considers that, even if the fixed-to-mobile substitution is less pronounced for business users, there would still be a chain of substitution between the products (i.e. mobile > residential PSTN > business PSTN), meaning it is justifiable to include all three in the same product market. However, as mentioned in the draft Determination, given that the constraint from mobile is not as strong on the business PSTN product as it is on the residential PSTN product, the Authority will continue to monitor developments in the business PSTN product, with a view to intervening should competition concerns emerge.

Zain
Zain raises the same concern as VIVA that mobile may not be a strong substitute for the business PSTN product and that the residential and business PSTN products may not be substitutes because of the VAS offered with the business products. These concerns have been addressed above and the Authority does not repeat its conclusions here.
The Authority’s final conclusions on the definition of the relevant retail markets

126. In the absence of evidence to suggest the contrary, the Authority maintains the market definition as per the draft Determination.

127. That is, the markets cover the relevant retail markets for access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, and are therefore defined as:

a. The retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls, which includes PSTN, mobile and IP-based solutions\(^{28}\) of equivalent functionality, where equivalent functionality is defined to be the offer of:
   i. One voice channel; and/or
   ii. Standard customer support.

b. The retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, which includes ISDN and IP-based solutions\(^{29}\) of equivalent functionality, where equivalent functionality is defined to be the offer of:
   i. Two or more voice channels; and/or
   ii. Advanced customer support (such as dedicated customer support, dedicated account manager, etc.).

128. Both markets are defined to be national in scope.

\(^{28}\) These will include domestic call products provided over WIMAX/LTE.

\(^{29}\) These will include domestic call products provided over WIMAX/LTE.
6 Assessment of whether there is SMP in the retail markets for access to domestic call services

129. Consistent with the Modified Greenfield approach,\textsuperscript{30} the existing RTN Regulation has been excluded from the Authority’s assessment of competition in the retail market. Consequently, the Authority's assessment focuses on the competitive constraints that operate independently of any SMP finding in this market.

130. As outlined in the Authority’s Competition Guidelines,\textsuperscript{31} several factors can be considered in assessing SMP and dominance. Given the characteristics of the markets under consideration and their evolution since 2008, the most important factors are described briefly below:\textsuperscript{32}

   a. Market shares and existing competition: A current snapshot of market shares indicates the market power held by each operator. Analysing market shares over time reveals how competition is evolving and allows a forward-looking assessment. This is because the trend in market shares show whether competition is intensifying or weakening, and therefore if the market power of current operators is likely to decrease or increase.

   b. Barriers to potential entry and expansion: The extent to which the threat of potential entry or by expansion by other operators will be a constraint on existing operators will depend on whether barriers to entry or expansion are significant. Entry barriers occur when an existing operator in a market has an advantage over potential entrants. Barriers to expansion are similar but relate to the ability of an existing operator to expand. For example, where an existing competitor faces capacity constraints that limit its ability to increase its scale of production.

   c. Countervailing buying power: Countervailing buyer power refers to the ability of buyers to limit the ability of sellers to exercise market power. It refers to the relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers, and is most evident where buyers and sellers have to negotiate. Countervailing buyer power is enhanced where the following conditions apply:

      i. the buyer is well-informed about alternative sources of supply;

      ii. the buyer could switch to alternative sources of supply without incurring significant costs;

      iii. the buyer could produce the input itself or “sponsor” new entry by another supplier; and

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\textsuperscript{30} See paragraph 21 above.

\textsuperscript{31} See “Competition Guidelines: Guidelines Issued by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority”, 18 February 2010 (Ref: MCD/02/10/019).

\textsuperscript{32} The Authority also considered other factors such as evidence on prices and profits which have been discussed in other sections of this document, and the evidence found supports the conclusions of this section.
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iv. the buyer is an important outlet for the seller and therefore the seller would be prepared to negotiate i.e. limited alternative buyers.

131. These factors are discussed in more detail separately for the mass-market and premium access to calls markets in the sections below.

6.1 Retail market for mass-market access to call services

132. This section carries out the competitive assessment for the retail market for mass-market access to call services which has been defined in Section 5.2 to include PSTN, mobile and IP-based solutions of equivalent functionality, where equivalent functionality is defined to be the offer of:
   a. One voice channel; and/or
   b. Standard customer support (which excludes additional services such as but not limited dedicated customer support, dedicated account manager, etc.).

6.1.1 Market shares and existing competition

133. Figure 22 shows that the market the market is served predominantly by the Batelco, VIVAVIVA and Zain. The remaining players make up less than 2% of the subscriber market.

134. Since 2008, Batelco's market share has consistently declined. The fall in market share is most likely driven by the increasing uptake of mobile, which explains the increase in VIVA's market share over the same period.
Figure 22: Subscriber market shares in the mass-market

Source: The Authority's analysis based on operator data

135. When examining the market situation in terms of traffic carried in Figure 23, the importance of mobile is highlighted again. [XX].
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Figure 23: Traffic market shares in the mass-market, 2014

Source: The Authority’s analysis based on operator data

136. Figure 24 compares the trend in Batelco, VIVA and Zain’s ARPU. The ARPU for all three have largely been falling.

33 Traffic shares cannot be shown over time as the ISDN traffic (not part of the mass-market) was included in the business PSTN traffic prior to 2013.

34 Batelco’s revenue data available is not split between ISDN and business PSTN. Therefore, Batelco’s ARPU excludes the ARPU from its business PSTN product. However, as seen in the section on relevant customer market, only the monthly charge differs by BD 1 between residential and business PSTN products. Furthermore, the subscriber numbers for residential and business PSTN users were similar in 2014. Thus, the residential PSTN ARPU is likely to be reflective of the business PSTN ARPU.
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Figure 24: Evolution of operator’s ARPUs for mass-market

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[<]
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[<]
[<]
Source: The Authority’s analysis of operator data

137. Moreover, the constraint on Batelco’s pricing comes primarily from mobile providers who operate their own networks and are not dependent on any wholesale access products. Thus, even in the absence of wholesale regulation, it is unlikely that the market outcomes would be very different.

138. While the market share of each of the three largest players is in excess of the 25% threshold after which SMP can be considered, the Authority does not view this to be indicative of a competition problem. VIVA’s market share has increased over time and does not stem from any inherent advantages, such as those that would usually come from being a former incumbent. Batelco’s market shares have been declining over time and other market indicators (prices, ARPUs, etc.) suggest that competition has evolved in the market.

139. Furthermore, the competition guidelines require that a finding of SMP be based on a market share threshold of 25%, so long as this is supported by other evidence. As discussed, this does not appear to be the case.

140. On balance, given the evolution of market shares and ARPUs and the current split of traffic in the market, the Authority’s preliminary finding is that this market appears to be competitive.

141. However, it is worth pointing out the constraint from mobile may not apply equally to business and residential PSTN. As was seen in Section 5.2 when identifying the relevant market, the evidence on switching between business PSTN and mobile was not as strong as that between residential PSTN and mobile. Thus, the Authority’s finding of competition
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comes with a note of caution that users of business PSTN products may be at risk of anti-
competitive behaviour.

142. For this reason, the Authority preliminarily maintains that the market is likely to be
competitive. However, the Authority will continue to monitor the developments in the
business PSTN product and intervene if it appears that the users of business PSTN
products are subject to competitive harm.

143. In conclusion, and in keeping with the Modified Greenfield Approach, the Authority is of the
preliminary view that absent regulated access at the wholesale level, there would still be
competition in the retail market for mass-market access to call services.

6.1.2 Potential entry and expansion

144. The Authority finds that the easiest way to enter this market would be through the
provision of IP-based solutions. Any provider of broadband services, either over their own
infrastructure or through the use of Batelco’s wholesale access products could plausibly
enter this market.35

145. As for mobile, a new entrant would need a mobile licence to be able to offer mobile
services and the Authority is not aware of future plans to increase the number of
licensees.

146. The Authority therefore finds that the barriers to entry in this market, while not non-
existent, are not insurmountable. However, it is worth noting that there has been very little
new entry in this market since the last review.

147. Barriers to expansion are likely to be low, given that all operators in this market offer their
services nation-wide.

6.1.3 Countervailing buyer power

148. The demand for mass-market access to calls at the retail level is highly fragmented. It is
therefore unlikely that any individual customer can exert enough pressure on an operator
to affect pricing decision.

149. The Authority therefore finds it unlikely that customers of mass-market access to call
services have any countervailing buyer power.

6.1.4 Preliminary conclusion on SMP

150. The Authority acknowledges that three largest operators have a combined market share in
excess of 90%. However, the operators appear to constrain each other’s pricing decisions
based on the evolution of market shares and ARPUs.

35 Technically, it is possible to enter the market through the provision of a fixed voice service over Batelco’s fixed
copper network through the bitstream products or LLU. It is also possible to enter this market via the Carrier Pre-
Selection (CPS) product.
151. The Authority's preliminary view is that the market for mass-market access to calls is effectively competitive and that no operator holds SMP, owing primarily to the strong competitive constraint exerted by mobile.

152. The Authority presents the operators' responses to this SMP finding next, followed by its own responses and conclusions on market definition.
Summary of and response to comments made on the Authority’s preliminary assessment of market power in the retail market for mass-market access to domestic calls from a fixed location

**Q2. Do you agree with the Authority’s view that that no operator holds SMP in the retail market for mass-market access to domestic calls from a fixed location? If not, please explain why.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of stakeholders’ submissions</th>
<th>The Authority’s analysis and responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Batelco</strong></td>
<td>The Authority notes that Batelco and Kalaam agree with its finding that no operator holds SMP in the mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location. VIVA and Zain’s disagreement with the Authority’s SMP assessment follows naturally from their views on market definition. However, the Authority has addressed the two operators’ concerns on the market definition in its analysis of operator responses to Question 1 (see page 43). Given that the market definition is the same as in the draft Determination and no evidence has been presented to contradict the findings of the SMP assessment given under this market definition, the Authority’s conclusions remain unchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batelco agrees that no operator holds SMP in the retail market for mass-market access to domestic calls from a fixed location.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kalaam</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalaam agrees with the view that no operator holds SMP in the mass-market.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIVA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIVA disagrees with the Authority’s definition of the relevant market and suggests that the markets should exclude mobile. Given this, it finds that the market definition and dominance findings should be as below:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Retail mass-market access to domestic calls from a fixed location in Bahrain for residential customers, with Batelco holding SMP.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Retail premium market access to domestic calls from a fixed location in Bahrain for business customers, which would include the business PSTN product; Batelco would hold SMP in this market as well.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is because VIVA believes that Batelco has had high and stable market shares between 2013 and 2015.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zain</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Zain disagrees with the Authority’s view because, as described in its response to Question 1, Zain believes that mobile and business PSTN are not substitutes. Thus, following its arguments in Question 1, Zain requests that the Authority should take into account non-price terms that could affect substitutability between services and should either define separate markets for business and residential PSTN products or include the business PSTN product in the premium access market, where 3atelco would have SMP.
The Authority’s final conclusions on the assessment of market power in the retail market for mass-market access to domestic calls from a fixed location in Bahrain

153. The Authority’s final conclusion is that the market for mass-market access to calls is effectively competitive and that no operator holds SMP, owing primarily to the strong competitive constraint exerted by mobile.
6.2 Retail Market for premium access to call services

154. This section carries out the competitive assessment for the retail market for premium access to call services which has been defined in Section 5.2 to include ISDN and IP-based solutions of equivalent functionality, where equivalent functionality is defined to be the offer of:

a. Two or more voice channels; and/or
b. Advanced customer support (such as dedicated customer support, dedicated account manager, etc.).

6.2.1 Market shares and existing competition

155. Subscriptions numbers in the premium access market are considerably lower than in the mass market. Overall the market only comprises around 3,100 subscriptions as of the end of 2014. As seen in Figure 25, Batelco has over 80% subscriber market share since 2010.

156. Although the number of subscribers for operators offering IP-based solutions (such as Lightspeed) has increased in recent years, a significant proportion of users continue to use Batelco’s ISDN product.
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Figure 25: Evolution of subscriber market shares in the premium access market\textsuperscript{36}

[\textsuperscript{X}]
[\textsuperscript{X}]
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[\textsuperscript{X}]
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[\textsuperscript{X}]
[\textsuperscript{X}]

Source: The Authority’s analysis of operator data

157. The traffic market shares are also skewed towards Batelco. As Figure 26 shows, the majority of traffic was generated by Batelco’s ISDN product rather than the IP-based solutions.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} Since the merger between Kalaam and Lightspeed occurred in 2015, they are shown as separate entities prior to 2015 for the purpose of this review.

\textsuperscript{37} Traffic data for Nuotel was not available for 2014. However, based on previous year’s traffic data, it is unlikely to change the fact that the vast majority of traffic was carried over Batelco’s network.
Figure 26: Evolution of market shares for domestic traffic originated from premium access

Source: The Authority’s analysis of operator data

158. Batelco’s high shares of subscribers and traffic have also translated into high revenue market shares. More than 90% of revenues in the premium access market accrued to Batelco’s ISDN services in 2014. Although disaggregated data on revenues is not available prior to Q3 2012, Figure 27 shows that Batelco’s share has consistently stayed above 90%. This could be indicative of limited competitive constraints from other operators in the market.
159. Based on an analysis of market shares over time, it therefore appears that Batelco has not been subject to competitive constraints from other operators.

160. Other market outcomes also indicate that Batelco has not been constrained in its pricing of the ISDN product.

161. Since the time that the RTN Regulation was introduced, Batelco has not submitted any NCTs to lower/change the retail tariffs of ISDN products. However, two NCTs have been submitted in 2014 to introduce and subsequently modify fixed voice “add-ons” (through increasing the volume of fixed voice minutes to other domestic lines included in packages and then offering unlimited minutes).

162. Additionally, ISDN is a legacy technology and the Authority considers that there are more cost-effective and efficient ways, such as SIP trunking, to provide multi-channel voice services. According to its website, Batelco does not appear to offer such SIP trunking solutions as yet. This may be an indication of market power.

6.2.2 Potential entry and expansion

163. There is very limited opportunity for firms to enter the ISDN segment as suggested by the lack of competitors in this market; there were only 2 providers of ISDN at the end of 2014 according to market data provided by operators.

164. Of the regulated wholesale products on offer at the moment, the Local Loop Unbundling product would allow ISDN to be offered. LLU has seen close to no take-up in Bahrain for
the provision of ISDN, which is to be expected given that ISDN is a legacy technology. A new entrant could also, in theory, enter the market by offering ISDN as part of a bundled offer using the E1 wholesale leased line.

165. As with the mass-market, the Authority finds that the easiest way to enter the premium access market would be through the provision of IP-based solutions. There has been an increase in the provision of IP-based solution is recent periods, as evidence of this. A provider of broadband services, either over their own infrastructure or through the use of Batelco's wholesale access products could plausibly introduce an IP-based solution.

166. The Authority therefore finds that although there are some barriers to entry in this market, they are not insurmountable. There is scope for new entry through the provision of IP-based solutions.

167. Barriers to expansion are likely to be low, given that all operators in this market offer their services nation-wide.

6.2.3 Countervailing buyer power

168. Although customers in the premium access market are generally large enterprises, there are still enough subscribers in the market for any one subscriber to not be able to unilaterally exert buyer power. Furthermore, the Authority's business survey data shows that ISDN customers are less willing to switch to alternative products, suggesting that there is a limited choice of alternatives to Batelco's ISDN services.

6.2.4 Preliminary conclusion on SMP

169. The Authority's preliminary conclusion is that the retail market for premium access products is not effectively competitive, but that it could become prospectively competitive if the wholesale remedies available are 'fit-for-purpose'. Batelco maintains a very higher market share in this market as measured by traffic minutes and revenues. Furthermore data from the Business survey shows that ISDN consumers are, overall, not willing to switch to alternative solutions in the event of a SSNIP.

170. Based on the above, the Authority's preliminary view is that the market is not effectively competitive and that Batelco holds SMP in the re-defined retail market (i.e. the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location).

171. The Authority presents the operators' views on this and its own response and final conclusion next.
Summary of submissions on the Authority's assessment of whether there is SMP in the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location

Q3. Do you agree with the Authority's view that that Batelco has SMP in the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location? If not, please explain why.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders' submissions</th>
<th>Authority's analysis and responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Batelco</strong></td>
<td>Batelco strongly disagrees with the Authority's SMP assessment in this market. Batelco believes that the Authority has not taken account of the impact of IP-based providers that use SIP Trunking, such as VIVA, on this market. Batelco provides a number of examples of the advantages of SIP Trunking over the legacy ISDN technology such as cost-effectiveness, ability to offer a wide range of services, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kalaam</strong></td>
<td>Kalaam also agrees with the Authority's SMP finding in this market. It notes that deregulation would give Batelco the whole market share and affect operators offering CPS services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIVA</strong></td>
<td>VIVA states that notwithstanding its responses to Questions 1 and 2, VIVA agrees with the Authority's SMP finding in the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zain</strong></td>
<td>Zain agrees with the Authority's SMP finding in premium access market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Batelco</strong></td>
<td>The Authority notes that Batelco does not agree with the SMP finding in the premium access market. Batelco argues that the Authority has not accounted for the impact of IP-based solutions. The Authority disagrees with this assertion. The Authority has in fact acknowledged in the annex to the draft Determination the impact of these solutions and included them in the market definition as substitutes for ISDN. However, as was seen in Section 6.2 of this annex, market outcomes indicate that Batelco has market power, with high and stable market shares, limited new entry and largely unchanged prices. Thus, the Authority finds that Batelco has SMP in this market at the time of this review. It is possible that IP-based solutions will see more take-up in coming years and constrain Batelco's pricing of the ISDN services. The situation will be reassessed at the next market review and the findings can be revised if this is found to be the case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kalaam, VIVA and Zain</strong></td>
<td>The Authority notes that VIVA, Zain and Kalaam agree with the SMP finding. The Authority disagrees with Kalaam's statement as the underlying reasoning assumes that CPS is the only means available to OLOs to provide premium access services. This, however, is not true as OLOs can also use wholesale bitstream or data connection products (e.g. Wholesale Local Access (WLA)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Authority conclusions on the assessment of SMP in the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location

172. The Authority's final conclusion remains that the market is not effectively competitive and that Batelco holds SMP in the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.
Summary of submissions on the circumstances which operators think such market (i.e. retail market for premium access to call service including domestic calls from a fixed location) could be deregulated

Q4. Under what circumstances do you think such market (i.e. retail market for premium access to call service including domestic calls from a fixed location) could be deregulated?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of stakeholders’ submissions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batelco</td>
<td>The Authority notes that most respondents have reiterated their views from previous questions. Zain has suggested that wholesale access to FTTx could help operators compete in the premium access market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batelco refers to its response to Question 3 and reiterates its belief that the market is already competitive as a result of the presence of the IP-based voice providers. Batelco also finds that the subscriber numbers for ISDN do not compare to that of mobile and VoIP services, both of which serve as reasonable substitutes for ISDN according to Batelco.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalaam</td>
<td>The Authority will continue to monitor the competitive developments in this market and give consideration to these responses in designing wholesale remedies in related upstream markets as and when those markets are reviewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalaam finds that Batelco has SMP for the moment and deregulation would have an impact on those using Batelco’s CPS service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIVA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notwithstanding its response to Question 1, VIVA finds that the premium access market should continue to be regulated because Batelco has significant market shares and OLOs cannot offer products that could serve as substitutes to Batelco’s premium services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zain believes that access to infrastructure-based wholesale services, such as FTTx, would help operators compete with Batelco effectively as most business solutions of equivalent functionality to the ISDN product and IP-based solutions require physical connectivity for value added service with multiple access points. According to Zain, the LLU wholesale product has not been taken up by OLOs</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
because of the investment required in the network and the limited high speeds that could have been generated using this product. Zain believes that this could be addressed by an appropriately priced fibre-based wholesale connectivity solution.
7 Overall conclusions on SMP and implications

173. In this section, the Authority summarises its preliminary conclusions on whether any operator has SMP in the relevant market. The Authority also sets out the implications of such conclusions in terms of the regulatory obligations that would be imposed on operators at both the retail and the wholesale level to remedy such positions of SMP / dominance.

7.1 Summary of findings and preliminary conclusions

174. The Authority last reviewed the retail market for domestic calls in the 2008 SMP Determination.

175. In that Determination, the Authority defined four separate retail markets and determined that Batelco had SMP in all four. Namely, these were:

   a. The retail market for fixed narrowband access services for residential customers. (Market 1a)
   b. The retail market for fixed narrowband access services for non-residential customers. (Market 1b)
   c. The retail market for fixed originated domestic calls for residential customers to either fixed or mobile subscribers within the Kingdom of Bahrain. (Market 2a)
   d. The retail market for fixed originated domestic calls for non-residential customers to either fixed or mobile subscribers within the Kingdom of Bahrain. (Market 2b)

176. Following the 2008 SMP Determination and the issuance of the Retail Tariff Notification (RTN) Regulation in 2010, the services that Batelco supplies in the retail market for fixed narrowband access (market 1a and market 1b) and fixed originated domestic calls (market 2a and market 2b) are subject to tariff controls.

177. Since 2008, there have been a number of developments in these markets. Most notably, the key ones being:

   a. Increased competition in the market for domestic calls arising from the widespread uptake of mobile services and the strong degree of competition between the three main operators Batelco, Zain and VIVAVIVA, which has resulted in falling prices and increased traffic minutes.
   b. The emergence of new technologies such as IP-based solutions, which are beginning to replicate the services traditionally provided by PSTN and ISDN technologies.

178. The relevant retail markets has consequently been redefined as:

   a. Retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location; and
b. Retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.

179. Given the competitive assessment carried out in Section 6, it is the Authority's preliminary view that no licensee has a position of SMP in the retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, whilst Batelco does possess SMP in the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location.

### 7.2 Preliminary implications

180. In the event that the Authority makes a final determination that no licensee has SMP in the retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, Batelco will no longer be subject to tariff controls under Article 58 of the Telecommunications Law and the RTN Regulation in respect of such services. As a result, Batelco will no longer be required to notify the Authority of any changes to Batelco's retail tariffs for these services.

181. In the event that the Authority makes a final determination that Batelco has SMP in the retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, Batelco will be subject to tariff controls under Article 58 of the Telecommunications Law and the RTN Regulation in respect of such services. As a result, Batelco will be required to notify the Authority of any changes to Batelco's retail tariffs for these services.

182. Batelco will also continue to be required to offer CPS for such services. This is because the Telecommunication Law\(^{36}\) requires all SMP operators to provide CPS services.

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Summary of and response to comments made on the Authority’s preliminary conclusions and resulting implications

Q5. Do you agree with the Authority’s overall conclusions and the resulting implications? If not, please explain why.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of stakeholders’ submissions</th>
<th>The Authority’s analysis and responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Batelco</strong></td>
<td>Although Kalaam agrees with all the Authority’s conclusions, the remaining respondents do not. This is for reasons outlined in their responses to previous questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For reasons outlined in its previous answers, Batelco does not agree with the Authority’s overall conclusions.</td>
<td>The Authority has already provided its analysis of the operators’ arguments in previous questions and does not repeat its analysis here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kalaam</strong></td>
<td>Given that the market definition and competitive assessment is unchanged from the draft Determination, the Authority’s final conclusions and implications also remain unchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalaam agrees with the Authority’s conclusions and resulting implications.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIVA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIVA disagrees with the Authority’s overall conclusions and their implications because of the reasons outlined in its response to Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zain does not agree entirely with the Authority’s conclusions and the implications. Although Zain agrees that no operator has SMP in the mass-market and that Batelco has SMP in the premium access market, it reiterates its view that the Authority should consider non-price factors which may affect the substitutability between products. Zain says that this could lead to business PSTN products being defined as a separate market or being included in the premium access market, where Batelco could have SMP.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Authority's final conclusions on SMP and resulting implications

183. Having taken into account the stakeholders' submissions, the Authority's final conclusions on SMP and their implications remain the same as in the draft Determination.

184. The relevant retail markets are as follows:
   a. Retail market for mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location where no licensee has a position of SMP; and
   b. Retail market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location where Batelco has SMP.

185. In the mass-market access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location, Batelco will no longer be subject to tariff controls under Article 58 of the Telecommunications Law and the RTN Regulation in respect of such services.

186. In the market for premium access to call services including domestic calls from a fixed location:
   a. Batelco will be subject to tariff controls under Article 58 of the Telecommunications Law and the RTN Regulation in respect of such services. As a result, Batelco will be required to notify the Authority of any changes to Batelco's retail tariffs for these services.
   b. Pursuant to Article 40 of the Telecommunications Law, Batelco will also continue to be required to offer CPS for such service in the Premium Access market which requires all SMP operators to provide CPS service.

However, the Authority recognises that the CPS service is primarily used in the market for international outgoing calls from Bahrain, which has been found competitive, thus meaning that Batelco should no longer face ex-ante obligations in that market.

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A2.1 Market definition

187. As mentioned in Section 3, the Authority came to the conclusion that the relevant markets should be defined as:

a. The retail market for fixed narrowband access services for residential customers. (Market 1a);

b. The retail market for fixed narrowband access services for non-residential customers. (Market 1b);

c. The retail market for fixed originated domestic calls for residential customers to either fixed or mobile subscribers. (Market 2a); and

d. The retail market for fixed originated domestic calls for non-residential customers to either fixed or mobile subscribers. (Market 2b).

188. The reasoning behind this market definition is discussed next.

A2.1.1 Separating access and calls markets for fixed line services

189. After considering operator responses regarding the subject, the Authority noted that there was some merit in the arguments that there was limited demand-side substitutability between fixed access and calls at the time. It was argued that the two products were complements rather than substitutes and were not always sold as a bundle. Furthermore, the degree of competition in the two markets was found to be different with several OLO’s competing with Batelco in the market for call services.

190. Supply-side substitutability was also argued to be limited because of the inability to switch from calls to access given the costs involved in rolling out a local access network.

191. The Authority therefore defined the markets for access and calls separately. This approach was also compatible with the approach taken by the European Commission at the time.40

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A2.1.2 Customer Level Segmentation

192. The Authority noted that it was necessary to consider two aspects of market definition when choosing whether to divide the market between business and residential customers. These were:
   
a. Possible demand-side substitutability, i.e. the extent to which services offered to business and residential customers are different; and
   
b. Possible supply-side substitution between providing access services to business and residential customers.

193. On the demand side, the Authority noted the range of fixed access services available in the market. These included both fixed PSTN\textsuperscript{41} and ISDN services, broadband internet services and leased line services.\textsuperscript{42}

194. Batelco was able to differentiate its products between customer segments and sustain this differentiation. The Authority therefore found sufficient evidence to suggest that a business faced with an increase in the relative price of business line rental would be unable to switch to a residential service.

195. Furthermore, the Authority noted the different expectations that each group may have regarding their service. They cited the expectations regarding fault repair as an example of where these differences may manifest themselves.

196. On the supply side, the Authority found that a hypothetical monopolist provider of residential narrowband access could reasonably sustain a SSNIP above the competitive level due to high barriers to entry faced by a supplier of narrowband access to businesses.

197. Given these explanations the Authority made the decision to separate the market for business and residential customers for both the access and calls markets.

A2.1.3 Fixed-mobile substitutability in the narrowband access markets

198. The Authority's analysis also considered the extent to which fixed and mobile access formed part of the same market.

199. From a demand-side substitutability perspective, the Authority considered the following:

   a. The nature of the services offered by providers - The Authority noted that a mobile connection allowed the consumer to make calls from any location whereas a fixed line only allowed access at home.

\textsuperscript{41} As has been mentioned, Public Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN") technically includes all networks i.e. POTS, ISDN, Managed VnIP, mobile networks etc. However, the 2008 Review used "PSTN" as shorthand for the traditional fixed voice service provided over the fixed access copper network i.e. POTS. This applies to the current market review as well i.e. the fixed voice service over the copper fixed access network is referred to as "PSTN" throughout this document.

\textsuperscript{42} The Authority considered Leased Lines to be a separate market and so excluded them from their analysis on this topic.
b. The levels of penetration of both services - The Authority hypothesised that, given the increase in penetration of mobile devices in Bahrain, if there were a high degree of substitutability between the two types of access products then the increase in the use of mobile devices would lead to a decrease in households owning fixed lines. This was not the case in Bahrain where the amount of fixed line customers had been unaffected by the increase in mobile penetration.

200. Thus, the two were not found to be demand-side substitutes.

201. On the supply side, the Authority concluded that it would be difficult for a supplier of mobile services to enter the market for fixed services in response to a SSNIP from a hypothetical monopolist. This was due to high sunk costs associated with establishing a fixed network.

202. An operator in the market for fixed services would also be unable to enter the mobile services market immediately as licenses to operate in the market are controlled by the Authority.

203. The fixed access markets were therefore not defined to include mobile access.

A2.1.4 Fixed-mobile substitutability in the calls markets

204. The Authority also analysed the extent to which fixed and mobile originated calls formed part of the same market.

205. The Authority considered that if fixed and mobile originated calls were in the same market, there would be evidence of substitution between the two call types following changes in their relative prices. However, there had been limited price changes for domestic calls since liberalisation and so, limited available evidence of any switching.

206. Furthermore, the trends in call volumes did not suggest there was switching between fixed and mobile. Specifically, there was no evidence of falling volumes of fixed line traffic, which would have been expected if customers were switching from fixed to mobile to make domestic calls. Also, it was found that mobile calls were considerably more expensive than those originated on a fixed network.

207. Given this, mobile call services were not included in the market for fixed domestic call services.

A2.2 Competitive assessment

208. In the 2008 Review, the Authority came to the view that Batelco had SMP, and that there was insufficient competition, in all four of the relevant markets, including the market for residential and non-residential domestic call services based on an analysis of market shares, barriers to entry, market developments, etc. as per the competition guidelines.
A2.2.1 Narrowband access markets

209. With regards to the narrowband access markets, the Authority found in its 2008 Review that Batelco had a volume market share of greater than 90% in both the residential and non-residential markets and that no significant changes had occurred in Q1 and Q2 2007.

210. Batelco enjoyed a greater than 90% market share in the domestic calls market in Q2 2007. Whilst the company’s market share had decreased from 100% in 2006 the Authority noted that the introduction of wholesale products through OLO’s had done little to challenge Batelco’s monopoly position.

211. Furthermore, the barriers to entry in the fixed access markets for non-residential and residential customers were found to be high. Most of the costs of Batelco access network are sunk in nature and so, Batelco’s network would not be easily duplicated.

212. The Authority noted the need to provide effective wholesale upstream regulation to prevent Batelco utilising its dominance of the underlying infrastructure to leverage market power at a downstream level to hinder the development of competition.

213. The Authority found that the impact of the competitive entry of Zain and Mena Telecom in these markets was difficult to predict at the time. However, in the relevant time horizon, it seemed unlikely that it would exert strong competitive pressure on Batelco.

214. The Authority therefore concluded that Batelco had SMP in the fixed access markets for residential and non-residential customers.

A2.2.2 Fixed originated domestic calls markets

215. The Authority concluded that Batelco’s market share was almost 100% in the markets for fixed originated domestic calls and that its monopoly position had not been challenged despite the introduction of wholesale products.

216. Furthermore, the Authority could not predict the potential effect of the entry of the two National Fixed Wireless Services ("NFWS") licensees at the time. The Authority considered that their entry was unlikely to undermine Batelco dominance in the fixed originated domestic calls markets over the relevant time frame.

217. The Authority therefore concluded that Batelco had SMP in the residential and non-residential fixed originated calls markets and that there was insufficient competition in these markets.

A2.3 Conclusions

218. In the 2008 Review, the Authority determined the relevant markets to be defined as:

a. The retail market for fixed narrowband access services for residential customers. (Market 1a);

b. The retail market for fixed narrowband access services for non-residential customers. (Market 1b);
c. The retail market for fixed originated domestic calls 'or residential customers to either fixed or mobile subscribers within the Kingdom of Bahrain. (Market 2a); and

d. The retail market for fixed originated domestic calls 'or non-residential customers to either fixed or mobile subscribers within the Kingdom of Bahrain. (Market 2b)

219. Batelco was found to have Significant Market Power in all four of the relevant markets (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b).
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